UNCLOS III: a Flawed Treaty

DOUG BANDOW*

The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) has
spent nearly a decade drafting a comprehensive treaty to govern
the many uses of the ocean, which is, unfortunately, a fatally
flawed document that is inimical to American interests. The proposed treaty's seabed provisions violate philosophica4 as well as
practica, interests, and legitimatize principles that would have
an adverse impact in future internationalnegotiations. The benefits of the treaty's non-seabed articlesdo not outweigh these significant disadvantages. A substantial amendment of the Draft
Convention is necessary. Only a treaty that recognizes thatfree
market seabed mining and commercial exchange exploit no one
will increase the prospectsforfree exchange,free trade, economic
prosperity and even worldpeace.

INTRODUCTION

"[Tjhe internationalcommunity owns, and runs, everything beyond 200 miles and can hand the bill to U.S. taxpayers and con-

sumers." Former U.S. Senator Lee Metcalf.'
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea has spent nearly a
decade drafting a comprehensive treaty to govern the use of the
oceans of the world. The current Draft Convention (or draft
treaty) encompasses subjects such as navigation, pollution, fish* Special Assistant to the President for Policy Development; Deputy Representative to the Tenth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Geneva, August, 1981. J.D. (1979) Stanford University member of the
California Bar. The views expressed herein are the author's personal views and
not necessarily those of the U.S. government.
1. Quoted in Johnston, Geneva Update in THE LAW OF THE SEA U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 179 (Amacher & Sweeney eds. 1976).
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ing rights, economic zones, and seabed mining, in an attempt to
provide some benefits for every nation.
Unfortunately, the resulting package is a fatally flawed document that is inimical to American interests-both philosophical
and pragmatic. Unless the Draft Convention is substantially
amended, it is unlikely that the Reagan administration will sign,
or that the United States Senate will ratify, a comprehensive law
of the sea (LOS) treaty.
It was concern over these flaws in the Draft Convention that led
the United States, just days prior to the start of the Ninth UNCLOS Session, to announce its intention to conduct "a policy review" before concluding negotiations and to remove the Carter
holdover delegation leaders.2 Since the review was not completed
by the start of the Tenth Session in August, negotiations were not
completed; and the Conference set a "final" eight week session to

begin March 8, 1982, in New York.3
The conventional wisdom appears to be that the Administration
initiated the review at the behest of United States mining companies.4 While it is true that potential seabed mining-related companies have been critical of the Draft Convention, 5 there are
2. Inner office release of the Law of the Sea Interagency Group, March 2,
1981.
3. Law of Sea Conference Decides to Issue "Offial Draft Convention," But to
Allow For Continued Negotiations on "Certain Outstanding Issues," 1 U.N. Doc.
SEA/146 (Aug. 24, 1981) (on file with the author) (Press Release, U.N. Office at Geneva, Information Service). This deadline is an obvious attempt to pressure the
U.S. to complete its review. Nevertheless, this is not the first "final" session, despite the uncompromising official rhetoric-Conference President Tommy Koh
said that "We have postponed adoption of the convention by a year, and we will
not wait for it any longer." Laure Speziali, Le Courier (Geneva), World Opinion,
Aug. 26, 1981, issue No. 34, at 1, reprinted by Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission, Geneva (on file with the author) (informal discussions between our delegation and
others at the Tenth Session suggest that additional time would be provided if the
U.S. was seen as negotiating in good faith).
4. See Dickson, Scuttling the Sea-Law Treaty, NATION 665 (1981). This charge
has also been a dominant theme in the foreign press. See, e.g., Valentin Vasilets,
U.S. Changes Stance, Tass, March 5, 1981, in FoREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION
SERVICE (FBIS), 145 WORLDWME REPORT 1 (JPRS 77654, March 24, 1981); Smolik,
In the Service of Monopolies: Why Has Washington Launched a Torpedo Against
the Law of the Sea Treaty, Bratislava (Cz) Rolnicke Noviny, March 12, 1981, at 5,
reprinted by FBIS, 146 WoRLDwmE REPORT 10-11 (JPRS 77689, March 27, 1981);
Marine Seabed.s: World Patrimony, Lima (Peru) Expresso, March 21, 1981, at 14,
in FBIS, 152 WORLDWIME REPORT 9 (JPRS 77919, April 24, 1981); U.S. Volte-Face,
Delhi (India) National Herald, March 26, 1981, at 7, in FBIS, 151 WoRMaWME REPORT 6 (JPRS 77904, April 22, 1981); The Need for a Law of the Sea, London Financial Times, March 17, 1981, at 18, in FBIS, 151 WORL wME REPORT 4-5.
5. See, e.g., letter from Richard Siebert, Vice President, National Association
of Manufacturers to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig (Oct. 8, 1981) (on file
with the author); letter from David A. Herasimchuk, Director-Corporate Development; Global Marine, Inc. to Doug Bandow (Nov. 6, 1981) (on fie with the author);
letter from William L Milwee, Jr., President, Searle Consortium, Ltd. to Doug

A Flawed Treaty

[voL 19: 475, 1982]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

important philosophical and pragmatic objections to the proposed
treaty unrelated to the welfare of industry. As treaty critic
Michael McMenamin has pointed out:
It is not the State Department's duty here to negotiate enough procedural
safeguards in the UNCLOS treaty to guarantee the existing seabed mining
consortia an adequate short-term return on their investment.... A principle is involved here that should not be compromised... no matter how
many procedural safeguards are [included] .6

The most serious concerns are with the seabed mining sections
of the Draft Convention. The Convention establishes an International Seabed Authority, governed by an Assembly and a Council,

which would regulate private deep seabed mining. The Authority
would be empowered to deny permission to mine for a variety of

reasons and is specifically charged to favor the interests of the developing and other so-called disadvantaged States. The Draft

Convention would also create and subsidize an Enterprise to
mine the seabed for the Authority.
PHILOSOPHICAL

OBJECTIONS

The first set of objections to this seabed regime are philosophi-

cal. Attention paid to philosophy by past commentators has been
sparse.7 Unfortunately, this mirrors the focus of the UNCLOS

delegations for the United States and other industrialized countries, which have addressed the negotiations primarily in economic terms.8
The result was "an ideological vacuum" 9 that was filled by the
developing countries and their allies, that viewed the Conference
as the forum to conquer "greed and selfishness, prejudices and
Bandow (Nov. 1, 1981) (on file with the author); letter from M.R. Bonsignore, Vice
President, Honeywell to Doug Bandow (Nov. 5, 1981) (on file with the author).
6. McMenamin, Battle of the Seabed, INQUImY, July 6 &20, 1981, 17, 22. Accord,
Statement of Northcutt Ely before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2
(Sept. 30, 1981) (on file with the author). See Draggingon Law of the Sea, Washington Star, March 8, 1981, at F-2, col. 1.
7. A notable exception is Goldwin, Locke and the Law of the Sea, CoMAENTARY 46-50 (1981).

8. Comment, UNCLOS III: The Remaining Obstacles to Consensus on the
Deepsea Mining Regime, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 79, 109 (1981). An example of such a
lack of interest in philosophy on the part of the U.S. negotiators is provided by former U.S. delegation leader Elliot Richardson in a briefing memo prepared for
policymakers. E. Richardson, Law of the Sea-An Overview, (June 24, 1981) (on
file with the author).
9. Illa, Third World's Sea Pact Takes U.S. for a Ride, Wall St. J., Jan. 26,
1981, at 30, col. 3.

worn out economic doctrines."' 0 By seizing the philosophical
high ground and effectively setting the agenda of discussion, the
developing countries "foreordained the result of the conference
before it even began.""
Indeed, the seabed negotiations of UNCLOS have been almost
entirely an ideological struggle to define the meaning of the
phrase "common heritage of mankind."'1 2 Every seabed provision
embodies ideological conflict; if "it were an argument over short
term economic interests alone the issues would have been settled
already."13
By focusing on the technical and economic issues, the industrialized countries gave up their strongest and most consistent arguments-those of philosophy. The Reagan administration is no
longer willing to cede the moral high ground, as it believes its
principles of government and economics to be right and worth
defending.
The fundamental philosophical precept involved is the Lockean
notion that property ownership devolves on those who identify
natural resources and mix their labor with them: "As much land
as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property."14 Vesting ownership of previously unowned resources in producers-those who expend labor
and capital, who take risks, who have the greatest connection to
the resource-has substantial historical support.15
10. Remarks of Jens Evensen, Ambassador of Norway, at the informal plenary,
3 (Aug. 10, 1981). Accord, Comment, supra note 8, at 109.
11. Goldwin, supra note 7,at 48.
12. One need not reject the phrase, which is embodied in the draft treaty.
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/1278/art.
136 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Draft Convention]. One need only define it
as "a continuing right of free and nondiscriminatory access, free of production
controls, free of restraints of accommodation and restraint of trade." Ely, Commentary at American Enterprise Conference, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATrVES 149, 150 (R. Amacher &R.Sweeney eds. 1976).
13. Comment, supra note 8, at 108.
14. Goldwin, John Locke, in HISTORY OF PorIcAL PHmIsoP

451, 462 (L

Strauss &J.Cropsey eds. 2d ed. 1981). Accord, M. ROTmARD, FOR A NEW LmERTY
31-37 (2d ed. 1978); Goldwin, supra note 7,at 47-48.
15. Indeed, vesting ownership of natural resources in producers has an international precedent in the Spitzbergen Archipelago case. Goldie, A General InternationalLaw Doctrinefor Seabed Regimes, 7 lkr'L LAW. 796, 807-11 (1973).
It was also the method used to develop the American West. Anderson & Hill,
The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.LAw &
EcoN. 168-79 (1975); Statement of Robert W. Poole, Jr., President of Reason Foundation, before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 5 (Oct. 22, 1981). Indeed, civil law was often absent; during the California gold rush, for example, by mutual agreement by miners, title "was derived from the first locator, and continuity of work sufficed to
maintain persistance of ownership." T. RIcHARD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MINING
33 (1932). Accord, Goldie supra, at 804-07.
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Because no contrary comprehensive international agreement
has yet been ratified by all nations, the traditional notion of freedom of the high seas and open access to ocean resources is still
customary international law, giving American miners the right to
mine.16 Since there is no environmental need for regulation17 nor
any economic justification for regulation, other than to delineate
property rights,18 the UNCLOS should have built upon existing
customary law to create a system for vesting and protecting resource property rights of individuals to explore and develop the
seabed.' 9
Instead, "[n] ations have come to the conference table as if they
were stockholders, each with an equal share of stock and the
equal voting right that goes with it."20 Their notion of common
ownership goes far beyond even the traditional notion of common
access to common property,2 ' and they view nation States as part
owners of natural resources over which they have no control, or
contact with, and which they will not help develop. This is simply
an attempt to supplant the moral basis for property ownership,
serving "not as a moral guide, but as an escape from morality." 22
This new concept of the "common heritage of mankind" necessarily places the well-being of some nations and individuals arbitrarily ahead of those of others. In the case of the seabed, the
16. H. Knight, Legal Aspects of Current United States Law of the Sea Policy 78 (paper presented to AEI Conference: United States Interests in Law of the Sea:
Review and Analysis (Oct. 19, 1981); Goldie, supra note 15, at 797; speech by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman to World Affairs Council 3 (Oct. 9, 1981) (on le

with the author); Comment, supra note 8, at 87. The developing countries argue to
the contrary, but their case is generally unpersuasive. See id. at 85, 90-98.
17. R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES 225 (1979).
18. Tollison &Willett, InstitutionalMechanismsfor Dealing with International

Externalities: A Public Choice Perspective, in THE LAW or
ESTS AND ALTERNATIVES,

THE

SEA: U.S. INTER-

77, 85-86 (Amacher & Sweeney eds. 1976). Eckert even ar-

gues that creating an international body to vest property rights is undesirable if
the economics of the industry make the regulation more costly than any problems

resulting from the lack of regulation, such as poaching. ECKERT, supra note 17, at
24.
19. American Minerals Congress, Undersea Mineral Resources, 2 (Sept. 27,

1981) (on ifie with the author). Obviously, some reasonable compromise in an in-

ternational negotiation may be necessary. There are approaches, such as revenue

sharing, that could be taken to help the people in the developing countries. But
the proposed seabed regime is not intended to help the people of the developing
countries.

20. Goldwin, supra note 7, at 48.
21. Comment, supra note 8, at 99.
22. RAND, CAPrALsm: THE UNKNOWN

IDEA

20-21 (1967).

interests of the ruling establishment in a few developing countries are to take precedence over the fundamental rights of all individuals, including those of citizens of developing countries; the
oligarchy of a few will appropriate in the name of the many.23
Accepting these self-serving common heritage precepts has
guaranteed a draft treaty that offends other fundamental values
as well. For instance, the creation of an International Seabed Authority which can restrict entry into the market, set production
limitations, and mandate the transfer of technology violates miners' and consumers' rights of economic liberty. The type of intervention proposed by the draft treaty should be "excluded as
generally inadmissible in a free society . . .," being one of the
"kinds of governmental measures which should be precluded on
principle and which could not be justified on any grounds of
24
expediency."
Such a right to economic freedom arises from the natural right
of self-ownership and the necessary corollary right to transfer and
trade the fruits of one's own labor.2 5 It also arises as a necessary
adjunct-indeed, prerequisite-to political freedom, by restricting
the general authority of government over people and creating
26
counterforces to concentrated government power.
The creation of the Enterprise, with the many monopolistic advantages accorded it, such as funding and technology transfer, violates the general American principle of opposition to
monopolies. 27 This concern should be greatest with respect to
government monopolies because government monopolies possess
not only economic power, but also political power and they are
able to use that power to insulate themselves from economic
23. Cf.id at 21 (discussion of "the common good"); RoTBAD, supra note 14,
at 32 (discussion of the "world communal solution").
24. F. HAYEK, THE CONSITrUTION OF LIBERTY 220-21 (1960).
25. ROTHBARD, supra note 14, at 39. Cf. HAYEK, supra note 24, at 230 (discussion of relationship between individual freedom and freedom of contract).
26. M. FRIEDmAN & R. FREDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 2-3 (1980); B. SmGAN, EcoNOmIC LmERTIES AND THE CoNsTrutnoN 83-84 (1980); Berger, Speaking to the Third
World, COmmENTARY 29, 31 (1981). Cf. Statement by President Ronald Reagan at
the Opening of the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development 2 (Oct.
22, 1981) (on file with the author) (discussion of economic freedom and "human
progress"). So fundamental are these rights that the framers of the Constitution
viewed their protection as the "prime object of government." SIEGAN, mpra, at 83.
And despite the passage of 200 years, the reasons for preserving economic liberty
remain just as essential. SiEGAN, supra,at 83; Speech by President Ronald Reagan
to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia 9 (Oct. 15, 1981) (on file with the
author).
27. This general policy is most obviously manifested by the antitrust laws.
See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2455 (1890) (Remarks of Senator Sherman). Such concern
extends to foreign commerce. See, e.g., W. FUGATE, FoREI N COERCE AND THE
ANTrrUsT LAws 201-22 (2d ed. 1973).
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forces. 2 8
Finally, the favoritism shown the Enterprise through, for example, extensive financial and technological subsidies amounts to
discrimination against private individuals, violating the fundamental American abhorrence of governmental "discrimination in
any form." 29 Indeed, "[tihe role of Government is to protect
[men] in the enjoyment of their rights and make certain of their
equality of opportunity."0 Agreeing to a Seabed Authority that
so blatantly discriminates against American citizens violates
these general concerns of equal opportunity.
PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS

The second set of objections to the seabed regime is practical in
character. The seabed mining provisions of the Draft Convention
pose two significant dangers: restricting the world supply of minerals and, in particular, our access to strategic minerals; and creating a pernicious precedent for future international negotiations.
Restricting Access to Minerals
The first danger focuses on our importation of minerals for industrial production. Increasing the world supply of minerals
would be economically beneficial to the United States and the
rest of the world. It has been estimated that preventing any seabed mining from taking place could cost consumers in the United
States alone more than $100 million (1979 dollars) annually by
1990, and more than one billion dollars (1979 dollars) by the early
part of the next century.3 1
28. Former President Coolidge once warned that 'This country would not be

the land of opportunity, America would not be America, if the people were shackled with government monopolies." Acceptance speech by President Calvin Coolidge (Aug. 14, 1924), in H.L MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON
HsToPcAL PRINcTrrEs 807 (1942).
29. Letter from Senator John F. Kennedy to Mrs. Emma Guffey Miller, Chairman of the National Woman's Party (Oct. 21, 1960), reprintedin S. REP. No. 994,
87th Cong., Ist Sess. 689 (1961).
30. Answer by Senator John F. Kennedy to question No. 5 submitted by the

Associated Press (Sept. 26, 1960), reprintedin S. REP. No. 994, 87th Cong., Ist Sess.
1055 (1961).
31. Johnston, The Economics of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 13 MARINE
TEcH. Soc'y J. 26, 29 (1979-1980). It is of note that seabed mining would benefit the
developing countries as well as developed countries, since most are minerals consumers. Johnston, supra at 28-29. Cf. 1 A. SMrn, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 461-62
(1937) (discussion of how wealthy neighbors economically benefit poorer nations).

Mining also has strategic significance, since we import more
than ninety percent of our supply of many critical minerals, such
as cobalt, vital to the aerospace industry, and chromium, necessary to make stainless steel.32 A seabed mining industry could
greatly reduce our dependence on potentially unstable overseas
suppliers because seabed mineral nodules, containing cobalt,
manganese, nickel, and copper, are "abundantly strewn across the
ocean floor."33 Though the potential for an effective "OPEC" of
minerals may be unlikely, at least in the short-term,3 4 seabed supplies will become more important in the future as land-based min35
eral supplies are depleted.
The proposed treaty would severely threaten this potentially
abundant source of mineral resources. The free market economy
36
is "by far the most productive form of economy known to man."

Regulation generally limits experimentation and productivity and
raises costs-in other words, makes it more difficult for the market to function. 37 Indeed, studies of the effects of economic regulation in area after area consistently find it to be inefficient,
38
counter-productive, and frequently perverse.
Seabed mining is no exception. Virtually any regulatory structure will pose inefficiencies and misallocations, but the restrictive
regime proposed by the Draft Convention is "unique... in the
Moreover, some developing countries, such as India, may become seabed miners. See Ocean FloorDiscoveries "Stun" Major Powers, The Times of India (Bombay), March 16, 1981, at 5, in FBIS, 154 WORLDWIDE REPORT 3-4 (JPRS 78026, May 8,
1981); Huge Carpet of Manganese Nodules Discovered, Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia)
Business Times, March 17, 1981, at I, in FBIS, 154 WORLDWIDE REPORT 5 (JPRS
78026).
32. Holden, Getting Serious About Strategic Minerals, 212 SCIENCE 305-07
(1981).
33. Keating, American Citizen and the Minerals Squeeze 6 (Aug. 1, 1980) (to
be published). Accord, R. ECKERT, supra note 17, at 214-19; Johnson &Logue, Economic Interests in the Law of the Sea Issues, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 37 (Amacher & Sweeney eds. 1976).
34. Frank, Jumping Ship, 43 FOREIGN POL'Y 121, 129-30 (1981); Darman, The
Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, FOREIGN ArF. 373, 385 (1978); REPORT ON
THE U.N. THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA HOUSE COML ON FOREIGN
AFFAms, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (Comm. Print 1981) (Resumed 10th Sess., Cong.
Benjamin Gilman).
35. Darman, supra note 34, at 386. Cf. STAFF OF SENATE Cons. ON INTERNAL
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SEABED COMMITrEE THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND MARINE MINERAL DEVELOPmENT 9 (Comm. Print 1971) (discussion of recent expropriations of American
overseas mining operations and concluding that "the United States would do well
to make sure that our rights to the seabed are not lost to some of the puerile developing nations").
36. ROTHBARD, supra note 14, at 40. See Ronald Reagan statement, supra note
26, at 2.
37. HAYEK, supra note 24, at 224, 228.
38. For an excellent survey of more than 50 studies of economic regulation,
see SIEGAN, supra note 26, at 283-303.
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degree to which" it will promote inefficiency. 39 This is because
the specific provisions of the Draft Convention are virtually antithetical to the goal of seabed mining. The problems include: 40
bias against production, technology transfer, lack of assured and
non-discriminatory access, discrimination in favor of the Enterprise, Authority costs, hostile investment climate, and review
conference.
Bias Against Production
Instead of encouraging seabed mining development, the goals of
the Authority are anti-development, including "orderly and safe
development," "rational management," "just and stable prices remunerative to producers," and "the protection of developing
countries from the adverse effects [of minerals production]. "41
The attempt to protect land-based producers, industrialized as
well as developing, has been embodied in an article explicitly setting a production ceiling and providing for commodity
agreements. 4
Technology Transfer
The Draft Convention requires that private contractors, as a
pre-condition to receiving mining licenses, obligate themselves to
sell their proprietary seabed mining and processing technology to
other operators and to transfer such technology to the Enterprise
39. R. Ec=ERT, supra note 17, at 297, 245-50. The dollar loss to the world community, as well as the U.S., could run into the millions, if not billions, of dollars.
Johnson & Logue, supra note 33, at 47-50; Johnston, supra note 31.
40. Even some supporters of the treaty acknowledge problem areas, though
they believe that the problems are generally either insignificant or remediable.
See letter from Lee Kimball, United Methodist Law of the Sea Project, to Doug
Bandow (Nov. 24, 1981) (on file with the author); Memorandum from Samuel &.
Levering, (Chairman of the Marine Environmental Subcommittee of the LOS Advisory Committee), et aL to James Malone (July 28, 1981) (on file with the author).
The list is not exhaustive: political issues involving U.S. budget commitments
and participation by liberation groups are in controversy but do not affect the viability of seabed mining.
41. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 150 paras. (a), (e), (q).
42. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 151. And the countries of Zimbabwe,
Zambia, and Zaire, particularly, would like to tighten these restrictions even further. See, e.g., remarks of Mr. Kakwaka, representative of Zaire, to the 66th General Committee meeting (Aug. 24, 1981), in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR/SR.66, at 5
(1981); Law of the Sea Conference to Resume Tenth Session at Geneva Beginning
3 August, 5-6, U.N. Doc. SEA/140 (1981) (Press Release, United Nations Office at
Geneva Information Service).

and to developing States.4 3 Though the circumstances under
which such transfer would occur are limited and compensation is
provided for, such transfers would still amount to a forced sale
and could never be fair to the private contractors."
Lack of Assured and Nondiscriminatory Access
The access criteria for seabed mining are theoretically nondiscriminatory; 45 but the initial contract approval process under the
Legal and Technical Commission could easily be politicized.4 6 Indeed, a private company must: obtain a contract to explore two
seabed sites at its own expense, ceding one to the Authority; face
competition from other potential miners for the other site; avoid
disqualification for violating the anti-density provisions (which restrict the number of sites per country in a geographical area) and
the anti-monopoly provisions (which restrict the number of contracts awarded to any particular country); and successfully gain a
production authorization from an Authority dominated by the developing and Socialist Bloc countries. 47
Discrimination in Favor of the Enterprise
The Enterprise would benefit from a donated mine site, subsidized financing, exemption from payments to the Authority, tax
exemptions, and transferred technology.46 These competitive disadvantages would include explicit special consideration granted
to developing countries and particularly to "land-locked and geographically disadvantaged" countries. 49
Authority Costs
The Authority would be an expensive undertaking, with the
United Nations Secretary-General estimating annual costs of between $41 and $53 million and initial building costs of between
43. Draft Convention, supra note 12, Annex II, art. 5.
44. This provision results in an apoplectic reaction from businessmen. See,
e.g., Letter from Hilton Davis, Vice President, Legislative and Political Affairs,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, to Senator Pressler (Oct.
26, 1981) (on fie with the author); letter from Dolan K. McDaniel, President, Geophysical Service, Inc. to Doug Bandow (Nov. 16, 1981) (on ifie with the author); letter from Louis L Schneider, Jr., Vice President-Manager, Marine Division,
Teledyne Exploration to Doug Bandow (Nov. 6, 1981) (on file with the author).
45. Comment, supra note 8, at 103.
46. Id. at 103; Ely, .supra note 6, App. 7-9; Remarks by Theodore Kronmiller,
before the Conference on Economic Aspects of National Security and Foreign Policy: The Challenge to a Free Enterprise Society 5-6 (Dec. 13, 1981) (on Me with the
author).
47. Ely, supra note 6, App. 1-13.
48. Id. at 17-19.
49. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 152, para. 2.
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$104 and $225 million.5 0 Such costs may be understated, considering the current plans for an 89,000 square foot building in Ja5
maica 5 ' and the expansive plans for activities of the Authority. 2
To fund the Authority, private firms would have to pay an application fee, an annual fee, and a production charge and/or royalty
charge. 53 Thus, the total cost may be very high.54
Hostile Investment Climate
The overall effect of these provisions is to "create a political climate hostile to private investment, and . . . [to so] restrict the
usefulness of the investment as to make it unattractive even if the
political climate were benign."5 5 It seems unlikely that unsubsidized United States investment, if any investment, would occur
under the terms of the Draft Convention.5 6
To the extent that seabed mining occurs, it would occur even if
the United States does not sign the treaty and United States flag
operations do not develop. Such production would still yield eco57
nomic benefits to the United States.
Moreover, contrary to the prevailing wisdom and the public
statements of the potential mining firms, there is at least a possibility of seabed mining without the treaty. This is so if the geographical and technological characteristics of seabed mining
50. Press Release SEA/140, supra note 42, at 6-7.
51. Telegram from American Embassy in Kingston, Jamaica to Secretary of
State (Nov. 1981) (on ifie with the author).
52. Study on the Future Functions of the Secretary-Generalunder the Draft
Convention and on the Needs of Countries,Especially Developing Countries,for
Information, Advice and Assistance Under the New Legal Regime, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF.62/_.76 (Aug. 18, 1981).
53. Draft Convention, supra note 12, Annex III, art. 13, paras. 2-4.
54. Ely, supra note 6, App. 20-26; Comment, supra note 8, at 104-06.
55. Ely, supra note 6, at 3.
56. American Minerals Congress, supra note 19, at 2-3; Johnston, supra note
31, at 28; Tinsley, The Financing of Deep-Sea Mining, 14-15 (paper presented to
AEI conference Oct. 19, 1981) (on file with the author).
Treaty proponents argue that even if this is the case, no mining will occur without a treaty. Therefore, refusing to sign the treaty gains no seabed benefits, while
losing the other benefits, such as for navigation. Richardson, supra note 8. The
problem with this argument is that it ignores the treaty's philosophical context
and its adverse political precedents. These turn the seabed provisions into a net
negative if there were insufficient offsetting benefits from encouraging seabed
mining.
57. James L. Malone, US Interests in LOS, 5-6 (speech at AEI conference Oct.
19, 1981) (on fie with the author).

create defacto property rights.5 8
Review Conference
Even if the provisions of the draft treaty were satisfactory, they
could be amended by a two-thirds vote of the member States after a review conference meets, fifteen years after the commencement of commercial production under the ratified treaty.5 9 The
developing countries could simply terminate the right of private
companies to mine, and customary international law might then
60
preclude unilateral mining.
InternationalPrecedence
Of even greater practical danger is the precedential impact that
signing the draft treaty would have: the legitimization of the principles of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which
essentially seeks to impose a legal duty on wealthier nations to
redistribute the wealth of their citizens to the governments of the
developing nations. 6 1 These principles are at variance with the
Administration's views on foreign assistance-that "the key to national development and human progress is individual freedom62
both political and economic."
UNCLOS is critical for NIEO proponents. This proposed Law of
the Sea treaty would be the leading edge of the attempt to instill
NIEO principles in all international organizations and institutions
and over other global problems, including energy, Antarctica, and
outer space.6 3 Thus, "in a single stroke, the direction of the sys58. Eckert, United States Interests and the Law of the Sea Treaty: Myths Versus Reality, 3-5 (paper presented to AEI Conference Oct. 19, 1981) (on ifie with the
author); Eckert, The Wealth Distribution and Economic Efficiency Consequences
of the New Law of the Sea, 14-15 (paper presented to the 14th Annual Conf. of the
Law of the Sea Institute, Kiel, FRG Oct. 20-23, 1980) (on file with the author).
Others share his belief that claim jumping is unlikely. Tollison & Willett, supra
note 18, at 86.
59. Draft Convention, supra note 12, art. 155.
60. Comment, supra note 8, at 107.
61. Id. at 112. The use of NIEO has been likened to economic warfare by the
developing on the developed States. Letter from Gary Knight, Professor, Louisiana State University Law School to Ted Kronmiller 22-23 (April 22, 1981) (on file
with the author). For a more detailed discussion of the NIEO, see Berger, supra
note 26, at 31; Berryman & Schifter, A Global Straitjacket, REGULATION 19-28
(Sept./Oct. 1981).
62. Remarks by President Ronald Reagan to the Opening Session of the Annual Meeting of the Boards of Directors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, 17 WEEKLY COOP. OF PRES. Doc. 1052-55 (Sept. 29, 1981);

Speech by President Ronald Reagan to the World Affairs Council (Oct. 15, 1981)
(on file with the author); statement by the President, supra note 26, at 2. See The
North-South Nexus, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1981, at 5-7; Berryman & Schifter,

supra note 61, at 28.
63. Knight, Legal Aspects of Current United States Law of the Sea Policy, 5-6
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tern of international development assistance would be radically
altered. The compulsory transfer of wealth from the developed to
the developing countries would become a reality of international
law. .. "64
A refusal to sign the proposed LOS treaty would deny the developing countries this essential first step in turning the NIEO
into reality. It would help forestall the creation of other negotiating forae and international structures to regulate other interna65
tional economic issues.
INADEQUATE BENEFITS FROM NON-SEABED ARTICLES

The draft treaty does encompass subjects other than seabed
mining, including economic zones, marine research, environmental protection, and navigation. Most treaty proponents argue that
even if the seabed mining provisions are flawed, the benefits accruing to the United States from the other parts of the treaty, and
particularly the navigation provisions, would make the proposed
66
treaty worthwhile.
The Administration is looking at the net benefits of the Draft
Convention to the United States.6 7 However, lest economic interests be "sacrificed in the perceived furtherance of narrow politicomilitary objectives and amorphous foreign policy goals,"68 the
benefits of other sections of the resulting treaty must clearly outweigh the significant costs of the seabed mining portion of the
treaty.
Unfortunately, the benefits of the other sections of the treaty do
not outweigh the disadvantages of the seabed mining provisions.
For instance, under the treaty, we would eventually have to share
revenue from petroleum production from the outer margins of the
(paper presented to AEI conference Oct. 19, 1981) (on file with the author); Ber-

ryman & Schifter, supra note 61, at 22-23; Kronmiller, supra note 46, at 3; Comment, supra note 8, at 81.
Indeed, key concepts from the draft treaty are embodied in the U.N. Moon
Treaty. Remarks of Theodore Kronmiller before the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oceans Policy Forum, 7 (Feb. 21, 1980) (on file with
the author). See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. No. A/34/664 (Nov. 12, 1979).

64. Kronmiller, supra note 46, at 3.

65. Comment, supra note 8, at 81; Dickson, supra note 4, at 668.
66. See, e.g., letter from Clifton Curtis, et al., Center for Law and Social Policy
to James L. Malone (July 30, 1981) (on fie with the author).
67. Lehman, supra note 16, at 6.
68. Kronmiller, supra note 46, at 1.

continental shelf, thereby discouraging a source of energy that is
nearer-term than most synthetics. 69 The boundary provisions
have been criticized as unsound and artificial.70 Marine scientific
research would be subjected to a restrictive "consent" regime. 71
The fisheries articles would add little to American and customary
international law. 72 And it has been contended that the pollution
articles would be only marginally beneficial, if not actually
harmful. 73
Most importantly, the navigational articles would not be a major
improvement: there "is no enhanced value from navigation in the
treaty to trade away."74 For example, the draft treaty retreats
from free navigation under current customary international law
by providing for weapons testing as a basis to temporarily suspend innocent passage in territorial seas.75
Similarly, traditional freedoms of the high seas currently prevail in areas beyond territorial waters. However, the proposed
treaty would establish 200 mile, economic zones without providing
explicit protection for freedom of navigation. Instead, the language is ambiguous. 76 Ambiguities also bedevil the straits passage articles, making it unclear as to which straits are
international and whether or not submerged passage of submarines is provided for.7 7
In any case, our security interests in straits passages are very
limited because of geography and technology and thus do not appear to be critical.78 Further, commercial and economic interests
make it likely that such straits will be open to commercial naviga69. Johnston, Petroleum Revenue Sharingfrom Seabeds Beyond 200 Miles Off-

shore, 14 MAiN'E TECH. Soc'y J. 28-30 (1980); Knight, supra note 16, at 10.
70. Hedberg, Evaluation of U.S.-Mexico Draft Treaty on Boundaries in the
Gulf of Mexico, 14 MAmWN T-Ec. Soc'y J. 32-34 (1980); Hedberg, Ocean FloorJurisdictionalBoundariesfor the Bering Sea, 14 MARINE TEcn. Soc'Y J. 47-53 (1980).
71. Knight, supra note 16, at 11.
72. Id. at 11-12. Indeed, some observers have sharply criticized them. See
Eckert, supra note 58, at 11-12.
73. Eckert, supra note 58, at 12-13.
74. Knight, supra note 16, at 9.
75. Kronmiller, supra note 63, at 2.
76. Reisman, The Regime ofStraits and NationalSecurity: An Appraisalof InternationalLawmaking, 74 Am. J.Irr'L L 48, 67-71 (1980); Kronmiller, supra note
63, at 2; Knight, supra note 16, at 9.
77. Reisman, supra note 76, at 66, 71-75. Relying on some sort of "understanding" years later on this point is perilous, shortsighted, "preposterous," and "naive." Id. at 74-75.
78. Osgood, U.S. Security Interests and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAw OF THE
SEA U.S. INTERESTS AN) ALTERNATivES 11, 13-24 (R. Amacher & R. Sweeney eds.
1976); Darman, supra note 34, at 376; Knight, The 1971 United States Proposalson
the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Passage Through InternationalStraits, 51
OR. L. REv. 759, 780-82 (1972); Osgood, U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law, 2
OCEAN DEV. &INT'L L. 1, 11-24 (1974).

[voL 19: 475, 1982]

A Flawed Treaty
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tion even in the absence of a LOS treaty.79
But even if the Draft Convention were to effectively protect critical interests in theory, it must protect them in practice as well,
for "[t] o sacrifice U.S. mineral interests for a perceived military
objective is at least debatable; but to sacrifice U.S. mineral objectives in mining the deep seabed for what may be an unattainable
military objective is folly ....-80 Unfortunately, the amount of
protection in practice seems dubious. (Indeed, since the Soviet
Union is more dependent on straits passage than the United
States, whatever protection the draft treaty may afford the United
States may give a comparatively greater benefit to the Soviet
Union.81)
The navigation articles would be subject to amendment, just
like the rest of the treaty.8 2 There is also a chance that some nations containing key straits might not sign the treaty. If they did
not, it seems unlikely that they would comply with a provision
83
which they refused to sign.
Finally, such navigational guarantees are likely to be commonly
supported only so long as it is in both parties' interests to do so.
History is replete with examples of countries breaking treaties
79. Johnson &Logue, supra note 33, at 64; Kronmiller, supra note 63, at 3. This
is the case even among countries who lack respect for international law, as was
demonstrated during the recent Iran-Iraq war. Johnston, Not So Dire Straits,
(presented at AEI conference) (on file with the author). (One panelist claimed
that there were other-undisclosable--reasons for the straits of Hormuz remaining open. Johnston responded that whatever the reasons, they proved his point.).
For a general discussion of the economic interests of countries in commercial navigation, see R. ECxERT, supra note 17, at 74-79.
80. Report on the Outer Continental Shelf, supra note 35, at 10. Interestingly,
although Elliot Richardson now believes that the seabed mining articles are acceptable, he has written thatto sacrifice not only the guarantees of freedom of navigation and overflight
discussed in this article but other gains as well, including effective protection of the marine environment, a stable regime for marine scientific research, and a workable definition of the outer limits of coastal-state
jurisdiction over the oil and gas resources of the continental margin...
would be an outcome preferable, nevertheless, to being bound by a system incapable of attracting the private investment without which the
wealth of the deep seabeds will continue to lie in total darkness miles beneath the surface of the ocean.
Richardson, Power,Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 59 FOREIGN AF. 902, 917-18
(1980).
81. Darman, supra note 34, at 377; Frank, supra note 34, at 127; Richardson,
supra note 80, at 911-12 (Richardson believes that independent reasons for greater
mobility outweigh these arguments. Id. at 912-14).
82. Ely, supra note 6, at 87.
83. Osgood, supra note 78, at 34-35.

when they have considered it to be in their national interest. 84
The international guarantees of a LOS treaty are therefore
likely to have only marginal effect. First, significant protection for
the few straits with real national security value would likely be
available through bilateral or regional treaties, 85 informal arrangements, 86 or some combination thereof.87 And whatever the arrangement, the most important factors which would insure
compliance are ability, willingness, 88 and the state of the bilateral
89
relations.
Second, to the extent that our national interests would be less
well protected without a LOS treaty, it seems fair to assume that
the United States would not allow theoretical international law
claims to stand in the way of protecting vital national needs. 90
Similarly, if a coastal State believed that its national interest required interdiction of United States shipping and also that United
States force either would not, or could not, be applied to prevent
such interdiction, it seems unlikely that they would not do so because of a general treaty signed by 150 nations in a past year.91
Thus, without a LOS treaty, the impact on navigation would
likely be felt in these cases where neither parties' national interests were critically at stake. The results would not be "disas92
trous"; rather, they would be "marginally less efficient."
Eliminating this "marginal inefficiency" would be a benefit, but it
would not be substantial enough to justify acceptance of the draft
84. L. BEILENSON, THE TREATY TRAP V. (1969); Stine, A Cynic's View of the
Moon Treaty, ANALOG 103, 104-05 (May, 1980). For a recent example involving U.S/

Mexican fishing agreements, see Department of State Press Release, "Mexico Terminates Agreements with U.S. On Fishing" (Dec. 31, 1980).
85. Eckert, supra note 58, at 8. In fact, one important nation approached the
U.S. in Geneva and indicated a willingness to reach an agreement with the U.S. on
transit rights, similar to the terms of LOS, if the U.S. did not sign the LOS.
86. Osgood, supra note 78, at 31, 34-35. Indeed, Osgood contends that "[t]here
is evidence, on the other hand, that some kinds of arrangements that accommodate U.S. and coastal or strait states' interests can more readily be reached if they
are not made the subject of international legal agreements." Id. at 27.
87. Gary Knight believes that "U.S. security and economic interests could be
sufficiently protected through a combination of domestic legislation, limited treaties, purchases of rights, unilateral action, and the occasional application of force."
Knight, Alternatives to the Law of the Sea Treaty, in THE LAw OF THE SEA: U.S.
INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES 133, 147 (R. Amacher & IL Sweeney eds. 1976).

88. Richardson, supra note 80, at 906; Knight, supra note 63, at 17.
89. Osgood, supra note 78, at 31.
90. Id. at 25, 29-30; Richardson, supra note 80, at 908.
91. Eckert, supra note 58, at 8; Osgood, supra note 78, at 27.
92. Darman, supra note 34, at 382. This is not to say that it would be costless,
of course: just not prohibitively expensive even in the worst case. See R. ECKERT,
supra note 17, at 71-74; Osgood, supra note 78, at 25-26, 29; Osgood, supra note 78,
at 35.
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93
seabed mining regime.

CONCLUSION

A substantial amendment of the Draft Convention is called for.
The Administration's major areas of concern, as expressed to the
Tenth Conference, were:
1. Gaining influence in the Authority commensurate with our political
and economic interests.
2. Creating a more balanced Council.
3. Setting as an overriding objective for the Authority encouraging mineral development.
4. Removing obstacles to mining by American companies.
5.. Assuring non-discriminatory and certain access to mining.
6. Requiring ratification by all member states for approval of
amendments.
7. Eliminating unreasonable interference with mining
operations.
8. Minimizing the budgetary impact of the treaty.94

Achieving substantial improvements across-the-board may be
exceedingly difficult. Virtually all of the other delegates at the
Conference warned the United States that the fundamentals of
the treaty were non-negotiable. 95 American treaty proponents
have also emphasized the same point: major concessions are
unlikely.96
The Administration also recognizes this fact;97 but to fail to ask
93. The Secretary of the Navy has explicitly stated that our navigational interests do not require us to sign the current Draft Convention. Lehman, supra note
16, at 4.
94. Statement by James L. Malone to the informal plenary, 4-5 (Aug. 13, 1981)
(on Me with the author).
95. See Statement by K. Brennan, AO, leader of the Australian Delegation to
the informal plenary, 3 (Aug. 10, 1981) (on fie with the author); statement by K.
Brennan to the informal plenary, 5-7 (Aug. 17, 1981) (on file with the author);
statement by Prof W. Riphagen, Chairman of the Delegation of the Netherlands to
the informal plenary, 2 (Aug. 17, 1981) (on fe with the author); remarks by Inam
Ul-Haq, Representative for Pakistan and Chairman of the Group of 77, at 11 (Aug.
17, 1981) (on file with the author); Remarks of Jens Evensen, Ambassador of Norway at the informal plenary, 10-13 (Aug. 10, 1981) (on file with the author).
Indeed, at least one foreign diplomat says a decision by America to ask for fundamental changes will be taken as a decision to kill the treaty outright. Anwar,
Minitreaty Among Big Powers Would be Countered by Maxitreaty, NEW STRArrs
Thms, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), June 5, 1981, at 14, in FBIS, 165 WomwmE REPORT 1 (JPRS 78713, Aug. 10, 1981).
96. Frank, supra note 34, at 137; letter from Curtis, supra note 66, at 1; letter
from Lee Kimball, supra note 40.
97. Speech by James L. Malone at the University of Virginia's Ocean Policy
Forum 2 (Nov. 12, 1981) (on ifie with the author); speech by Theodore Kronmiller
to the Marine Technology Society 3 (Sept. 9, 1981) (on fie with the author);

for substantial changes would leave us with a proposed treaty
fundamentally unacceptable to the Administration and the Senate.98 Admittedly, to ask may court potential failure of a Conference more than a decade in the making. However, the question of
what kind of global order is being created is of paramount importance. Indeech
the notion of conceding [the negative international precedents set by the
proposed treaty] to avoid the precedent of Conference "failure" (meaning
"lack of agreement") seems absurd. It would be to trade long-term, substantive failure for avoidance of temporary procedural failure. Trading
these objectional elements for marginal gains in the system of environmental protection and dispute settlement seems out of proportion. Trading them for questionable interests in treaty protection of distant-water
military mobility seems a tie to the past at the expense of the future. And
trading them to protect interests that might just as9 9well be protected without a comprehensive treaty seems no trade at all.

From the start, the UNCLOS has melded together subjects that
should have been negotiated separately. It has accepted outrageous demands as a basis of negotiation and neglected to protect
fundamental American principles. It would seem that the UNCLOS Draft Convention has become an agreement sought for
agreement's sake, as if the mere signing of any agreement,
whatever its substance, could guarantee international stability.
But this proposed treaty will not--cannot--guarantee international stability. Only a treaty that recognizes that free market
seabed mining and commercial exchange exploit no one will do
so. A treaty must be fashioned to meet the interests of mankind
and not just those of leaders of an ad hoc majority of the world's
nation States. Only then would the prospects of free exchange,
free trade, economic prosperity, and even world peace be increased, rather than decreased.

speech by Theodore Kronmiller to American Mining Congress Convention 9 (Sept.
9, 1981) (on fie with the author).
98." Speech by Malone, supra note 97, at 2.
99. Darman, 'upra note 34, at 388.

